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INTRODUCTION 
A bedrock assumption of almost all judicial and academic 
interpreters of the Constitution is that the Constitution is in large 
part permissive. That is, most laws or governmental actions are 
neither forbidden nor required by the Constitution but are 
merely permitted.l I will call this presumably rather large set of 
governmental actions "constitutionally optional." 
The purpose of this essay is to show that this assumption-
that there are (many) constitutionally optional laws and govern-
mental actions-gives rise to some immense and perhaps intrac-
table difficulties in justifying large areas of constitutional 
doctrine. At stake is the entire domain of the Equal Protection 
Clause (and the equal protection component of Fifth Amend-
ment due process), as well as the "equal protection" component 
of other constitutional rights, which is sometimes dealt with as a 
matter of equal protection, and sometimes as a matter of uncon-
stitutional conditions on the rights in question.2 At the most gen-
eral level, the theoretical difficulties I elaborate are all bound up 
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1. An approach contrary to this assumption is that outlined by Richard Epstein, 
who argues that a correct interpretation of the Constitution produces a blueprint of a 
single constitutionally valid set of laws. According to Epstein's Constitution, the common 
law prevails (with the distribution of wealth it produces), subject to some modification 
through the exercise of the police power and the eminent domain power. Epstein's con-
stitutional scheme leaves no theoretical room for government choice, hence, leaving no 
room for politics in the normal sense. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property 
and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harv. U. Press, 1985); Richard A. Epstein, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 189, 202-07 (1989); 
Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of 
Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 14-28 (1988); Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitu-
tional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 175, 178-80 (1989). 
2. Compare Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) 
and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (content-based speech restrictions invalidated 
under the equal protection clause) with, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 
481 U.S. 221 (1987) and Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (content-based discrimi-
nations among media invalidated on first amendment grounds). See also Church of the 
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in the question of why the greater power to choose the option or 
to forgo it does not include the lesser powers to place conditions 
on it or to distribute it unequally. How is it that one can have a 
constitutional complaint over conditions attached to or inequali-
ties in the distribution of a benefit that one has no constitutional 
right to in the first place? Unless that question can be given an 
answer, much of constitutional law will lack a solid theoretical 
foundation. 
I. THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS: OF 
LAWS, ACTIONS, AND OMISSIONS, BENEFITS AND 
BURDENS, INDIVIDUAL LAWS AND SETS OF LAWS, 
AND SWITCHES OVER TIMES 
The notion of constitutional optionality applies to any type 
of governmental action that can be subject to constraint by con-
stitutional norms. Thus, a law or an administrative rule can be 
constitutionally optional, but so too can an administrative or ju-
dicial decision in an individual case not covered by a pre-existing 
rule. Thus, a decision by a governmental official about whom to 
hire for a particular job might be a matter of optionality within a 
range of possibilities. So, too, might a decision by a judge about 
how severely to sentence offenders. 
An important corollary to the constitutional optionality of 
laws and governmental actions is that their omission-the failure 
to enact those laws or undertake those actions-is likewise con-
stitutionally optional. If, for example, public welfare or public 
education is a constitutionally optional benefit, then not only is 
provision. of such benefits constitutionally permissible, but so too 
is the repeal of those benefits or the failure to provide those ben-
efits initially. 
That omissions are constitutionally optional if their corre-
sponding actions are optional might seem trivial because it is an-
alytically true. Nonetheless, it becomes important if optionality 
forces a consideration of governmental motives: motives behind 
failures to act are frequently much more opaque than motives 
behind actions. 
Frequently, the notion of constitutional optionality is associ-
ated with benefits, particularly the benefits of the modern wel-
fare state. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated or implied that 
welfare payments, public schools, public libraries, and public 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (regulation discrimi-
nating against religious practice invalidated under Free Exercise Oause). 
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health care are constitutionally optional.3 The domain of consti-
tutional optionality, however, is much broader than those public 
welfare benefits. It includes any other benefits that government 
is constitutionally at liberty to provide or not to provide. And it 
includes as well all burdens with respect to which the government 
has a similar liberty. 
Thus, if the government has the constitutional liberty to im-
pose five years of imprisonment for robbery or ten years, then 
ten years of imprisonment is a constitutionally optional burden 
on those serving such a sentence. Likewise, if government has 
the constitutional liberty to regulate taxi service in particular 
ways or to leave it unregulated, the regulation of taxi service in 
those ways is a constitutionally optional burden on those 
regulated. 
In one sense, the point here is merely semantic. What I have 
called constitutionally optional burdens-for example, ten years 
imprisonment or regulation of taxi service-can be turned 
around so that constitutionally optional "benefits" are at stake: 
five years of imprisonment or freedom from regulation. And 
constitutionally optional benefits, such as welfare, can be viewed 
as burdens if one adopts the standpoint of the taxpayer. The im-
portant point, however, is not a semantic one. It is that the do-
main of constitutionally optional governmental action is quite 
broad. Indeed, it apparently includes almost all possible govern-
mental actions. 
Although it is common to speak of specific laws or govern-
mental actions as constitutionally optional or nonoptional, con-
stitutionality-and, derivatively, constitutional optionality and 
nonoptionality-is actually an attribute of entire sets of laws. 
Thus, public education might be regarded as a constitutionally 
optional benefit in the context of most sets of laws, but not if the 
remaining laws include a law conditioning the right to vote upon 
literacy or education. Likewise, a literacy or education require-
ment for voting may be a constitutionally optional burden but 
only if there is universal public education. And freedom of 
speech might demand either the set of laws a, b, and c or the set 
of laws x, y, and z but forbid the set of laws a, b, and z. If so, it 
will be true but misleading to speak of the optionality of any par-
ticular law a-z. Only if a particular law is optional-or nonop-
tional (forbidden or required)-in all possible sets of laws will it 
3. See generally San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-35 
(1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,546-47 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471, 484 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). 
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be accurate to speak of that particular law as optional (or nonop-
tional). Generally, when we speak of individual laws or actions 
as optional or nonoptional, we are referring to the entire set of 
laws to which that particular law belongs. 
Finally, true constitutional optionality requires that the gov-
ernment always be permitted to reconsider the current status of a 
benefit or burden. If government possessed the option whether 
to have, say, welfare or public education only at the onset of its 
existence as a government, but was required as a constitutional 
matter to stick forever with whatever choice it made at that time, 
nothing would now be constitutionally optional. Constitutional 
optionality now means constitutional optionality tomorrow and 
the day after. Although the Takings Clause, the Contracts 
Clause, the Due Process Clauses, and the Ex Post Facto Laws 
Clauses place some constitutional limits on government's ability 
to change otherwise optional laws-to protect against unfair up-
sets of expectations-government in general may constantly 
change its mind regarding optional benefits and burdens. As we 
shall see, this point about optionality has important implications 
for constitutional theory. 
II. THE DOCTRINAL DOMAINS OF 
CONSTITUTIONALLY OPTIONAL BENEFITS 
AND BURDENS 
As noted earlier, optionality questions are implicated most 
strongly in issues arising under the Equal Protection Clause and 
the equal protection components of other clauses-most notably, 
the Speech and Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. A true equal protection case always assumes that what is 
at stake is a constitutionally optional benefit or burden. The 
complainant is objecting, not to receiving, say, a certain level of 
welfare, education, or some other benefit or burden, but to re-
ceiving less of that benefit (or more of that burden) than a com-
parison group is receiving. If there is an equal protection 
problem with the way the optional benefit or burden is allocated 
among groups or individuals, it can be remedied either by gov-
ernment's allocating more of the benefit (or less of the burden) 
to the complainant or by government's allocating less of the ben-
efit (or more of the burden) to the comparison group. Thus, if 
the government is denying equal protection by giving whites 
more welfare than blacks, or by giving embezzlers less punish-
ment than larcenists, it can remedy the violation either by giving 
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blacks and embezzlers more or by giving whites and larcenists 
less.4 
Similarly, although freedom of speech is typically thought of 
as a noncomparative right-a denial of freedom of speech is ob-
jectionable even if government is denying it to everyone-there 
is a comparative (or equal protection or optional benefit and bur-
den) side to freedom of speech. For in many cases freedom of 
speech is nothing more than a ban on government's discriminat-
ing on the basis of subject matter discussed or viewpoint 
expressed.s 
Thus, in the area of time, place, and manner regulations, 
government has great latitude in deciding whether or not to per-
mit expressive behavior. For example, it may deny demonstra-
tors the right to demonstrate in a prison yard, to conduct a sleep-
in in a public park, or to burn their draft cards.6 On the other 
hand, it would also be constitutional for government to allow 
demonstrations in prison yards, sleep-ins in public parks, or draft 
card destruction. Thus, all of these activities represent constitu-
tionally optional benefits that government may withhold or grant 
at its option. What government may not do, however, is grant 
these optional benefits only to demonstrators expressing certain 
ideas or viewpoints, unless the government has a sufficient justifi-
cation for its discrimination in granting the optional benefits. In 
other words, there is an "equal protection" doctrine that applies 
to subject matter or viewpoint discrimination in regulating the 
time, place, and manner of speech. 1 
Similarly, when government is spending its own resources to 
speak, the courts have imposed an equal protection limitation, 
albeit quite erratically. Government funding of speech-its own 
or another's-is a paradigmatic optional benefit. Government 
need not give money to family planning clinics, to the endow-
ments for the arts or humanities, or to public broadcasting, nor 
need government run municipal theaters or even public schools. 
When it chooses the option of funding these enterprises, how-
4. This is why cases like Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that re-
striction of access to contraceptives to married persons violates Equal Protection Clause), 
are not true equal protection cases: the benefit, access to birth control, can only be ratch-
eted up because it is constitutionally mandated by the Due Process Clause. See Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
5. See note 2 supra. 
6. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (public 
park sleep-in); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning); Ad-
derley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (prison yard demonstration). 
7. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Carey v. Brown, 
447 u.s. 455 (1980). 
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ever, it faces some constitutional restrictions on its ability to 
favor certain ideas or subjects.s 
Much of Establishment and Free Exercise Clause doctrine 
likewise invokes a nondiscrimination principle in the granting of 
optional benefits and burdens. The Free Exercise Clause has re-
cently been narrowed by the Supreme Court to the point that it 
appears to cover very little other than discrimination. Thus, gov-
ernment may now be able to ban all uses of alcohol or drugs and 
all slaughtering of animals-none of which, of course, it is consti-
tutionally compelled to do-no matter how serious the effects of 
such bans on religious practices might be. What it may not do, at 
least without a compelling reason, is limit its bans to religious 
uses of alcohol and drugs or to religious slaughter of animals.9 
While the Free Exercise Clause deals with religious discrimi-
nation in the imposition of optional burdens, the establishment 
clause limits religious discrimination in the granting of optional 
benefits. Because every possible allocation of optional benefits 
and burdens will affect the relative prospects of various religions 
(and nonreligion) differently, the major difficulty under both the 
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses is to determine the 
constitutional baseline from which to measure discriminatory 
effects. 
As with the Speech and Religion Clauses, the Due Process 
Clauses have an equal protection component, though the courts 
have been much more willing to allow government discrimina-
tion in this area. Thus, while government constitutionally may 
finance the live births of indigent women without financing their 
abortions-that is, may condition the optional benefit of pub-
licly-financed medical procedures on how the constitutional right 
to choose between live birth and abortion is exercised-the 
Supreme Court has hinted that government may not condition 
the optional benefit of ordinary welfare or even publicly financed 
general medical care on forgoing the right to an abortion.to 
8. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,201-03 (1991); Federal Communications Com-
mission v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Board of Educa-
tion, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
9. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993); 
Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). 
10. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-75 n.8 (1977). 
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III. APPLYING THE CONSTITUTION TO OPTIONAL 
BENEFITS AND BURDENS: THE THEORY-
DEPENDENCE OF JUSTIFICATIONS AND THE 
IMPERIALISM OF THEORY 
A 
If there are constitutional constraints on the allocation of 
optional benefits and burdens, what explains them? How can it 
be that the Constitution prohibits giving more of good G to X 
than to Y -unless there is a sufficient justification for doing so-
but does not prohibit giving even less G to Y as long as X gets 
the same amount of G as Y? 
The texts of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
and the First Amendment's Speech and Religion Clauses surely 
do not contain clear rules dictating the results the courts have 
reached. And although some who make the Framers' original 
intentions authoritative find clear rules embedded in these inten-
tions, those rules tend to be much narrower constraints on op-
tional benefits and burdens than is found in current judicial 
doctrine. Thus, some read the intent behind the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to be a rule requiring that there be no racial discrimi-
nation in specific domains of benefits and burdens, a much 
narrower conception of equal protection than is currently 
enforced. It 
In today's jurisprudence, perhaps with the exception of fa-
cial religious discrimination, there are no per se rules in any of 
these domains, and surely none that can be said to be textual or a 
direct reading of the Framers' intentions. Instead, we have vary-
ing standards of judicial review, all of which refer to how govern-
ment must justify its allocations of optional benefits and burdens. 
The judicial doctrines in play refer to "compelling," "important," 
"substantial," and "legitimate" governmental interests. They 
also refer to degrees of "fit" between the governmental means in 
question and the ends those means are supposed to further. And 
they debate the level of generality at which the ends are to be 
characterized for purposes of determining means/ends fit, and 
how to deal with the fact that government usually pursues multi-
ple ends in a single act, or at least a primary end constrained by 
multiple secondary ones. 
11. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 123-24 
(U. of Okla. Press, 1989); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment 191-92 (Harv. U. Press, 1977). 
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How do we know what governmental interests are legiti-
mate, or how important they are, at what level of generality they 
should be characterized, and how the government's acts must 
"fit" with these various interests? The answer is that we cannot 
know these things without some normative theory about the 
proper ends of government. If we are Benthamite or Millian util-
itarians, for example, then we will be able to assess allocations of 
optional benefits by whether they maximize social utility. In-
deed, maximizing social utility is the only legitimate governmen-
tal end. It is therefore always compelling. And it is at the level 
of generality expressed by "maximizing social utility" that gov-
ernment's plurality of more specific ends must be characterized 
in order to determine whether its means "fit." Moreover, only 
100% "fit" at that level of generality is acceptable. For a utilita-
rian, no over or under-inclusiveness in the relation of means to 
ends is ever permissible where the end in question is "maximize 
social utility." 
A utilitarian normative theory would thus answer the ques-
tions about justifying governmental allocations of optional bene-
fits and burdens. So too would some contractarian normative 
theory such as that of John Rawls, a theory which several consti-
tutional theorists would read into the Constitution.tz Thus, for 
those theorists, an allocation of optional benefits or burdens 
would properly "fit" with "legitimate" and "compelling" ends de-
scribed at the correct level of generality if those allocations maxi-
mized the positions of the least advantaged. Likewise, those who 
would read the Constitution as embodying an essentially liberta-
rian normative theory of government would assess means and 
ends through the prism of their chosen brand of libertarianism.B 
Thus, the justifications at issue in assessing allocations of op-
tional benefits and burdens unsurprisingly require a justificatory 
theory such as utilitarianism, contractarianism, or libertarianism 
might provide. And here is the kicker: The justificatory theories 
that would provide the framework for assessing the allocations of 
optional benefits and burdens will tend themselves to undermine 
the optionality of those benefits and burdens. In other words, jus-
12. See, e.g., David AJ. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action (Oarendon 
Press, 1971); David AJ. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (Oxford U. Press, 
1986); David AJ. Richards, Fourulations of American Constitutionalism (Oxford U. Press, 
1989); David AJ. Richards, Conscience and the Constitution: History, Theory, and Law of 
the Reconstruction Amendments (Princeton U. Press, 1993); Frank I. Michelman, Fore-
word: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1 
(1969). 
13. See, e.g., Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 
(cited in note 1). 
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tifying allocations of optional benefits and burdens requires a 
comprehensive theory, but a comprehensive theory is a norma-
tive blueprint that leaves no options but rather either mandates 
or forbids every possible set of laws and governmental actions. 
When I say that any comprehensive theory that would justify 
(or invalidate) allocations of optional benefits will be a blueprint 
for government action that undermines optionality, I do not 
mean that any normative theory must render a moral verdict of 
forbidden or required on all possible actions. Although account-
ing for a domain of moral freedom is a theoretically difficult en-
terprise, especially for consequentialist moral theories, I assume 
that such a domain is theoretically justifiable when we are deal-
ing with individual moral agents. 
A domain of moral freedom is much more problematic, 
however, if we are dealing with the government. Although there 
may be some areas where the moral options of the governed 
(say, to prefer opera over dance) appear to translate directly into 
options for the government (to prefer a municipal opera over a 
municipal ballet), even then it is more accurate to say that gov-
ernment has no other option than to reflect the preferences of 
the governed. And when we move to optional benefits like wel-
fare or public education, it is difficult to imagine that any com-
prehensible normative theory would regard them as within the 
realm of individual moral freedom, much less a matter of govern-
mental moral freedom. 
Therefore, applying constitutional constraints to allocations 
of optional benefits is theoretically problematic. We cannot de-
cide whether the government's interests in support of its alloca-
tions are legitimate or sufficiently weighty without a 
comprehensive normative theory. A comprehensive normative 
theory, however, will undermine the optionality of the benefits in 
question and demand a single pattern of allocation. 
B 
Perhaps the most attractive solution to the predicament 
posed in the preceding section is to assume that more than one 
comprehensive normative theory can justify governmental acts. 
Thus, to simplify matters, let us assume that government acts in a 
constitutionally justified manner if its entire set of laws are con-
sistent with either the set of laws a thoroughgoing contractarian 
like Rawls would enact or the set of laws a libertarian like Nozick 
or Epstein would enact. In other words, the Constitution is con-
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sistent with either Left liberalism or Right liberalism but with 
nothing else.14 
On such an assumption we can explain both nonoptional 
constitutional rights and optional benefits and burdens. The for-
mer represent the area of overlap between Left and Right liberal 
theories, what both Rawls and Nozick would forbid or require. 
The latter represent the area in which the theories dictate differ-
ent results. Thus, while both theories would support a common 
core of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and privacy, Left 
liberalism would demand and Right liberalism would forbid 
many of the redistributive programs of the welfare state, such as 
welfare and public education. Those welfare state programs, re-
quired by one theory and forbidden by the other, would be con-
stitutionally optional. 
Optional normative theories may explain the existence of 
· constitutionally optional benefits and burdens. However, we 
have not yet fully explained constitutional constraints on the al-
locations of those optional benefits and burdens. Thus far, we 
have only explained one option, the option to choose that set of 
laws demanded by Left liberal theory or that set of laws de-
manded by Right liberal theory. We have not explained the 
existence of options that represent neither the pure Left liberal 
nor the pure Right liberal position. 
Put differently, we have shown how there can be a constitu-
tionally legitimate thoroughgoing welfare state and a constitu-
tionally legitimate thoroughgoing libertarian state. We have not 
shown how there can be a constitutionally legitimate modest wel-
fare state. And because orthodox constitutional doctrine as-
sumes many more optional benefits and burdens than the two 
stark, polar options of Left and Right liberalism-basically, the 
vast number of sets of laws that represent positions in between 
those poles-positing optional normative theories is not suffi-
cient fully to explain orthodox constitutional assumptions. 
What is necessary to explain the full panoply of options is 
this: We must assume that the Constitution permits the govern-
ment to choose not only between Left liberalism and Right liber-
alism but also among various positions that lie "between" those 
two poles (viewing the poles somewhat spatially). Thus, if Left 
liberalism demands $15,000 of welfare per year to the average 
poor person, and Right liberalism forbids welfare altogether, 
government has the constitutional option to choose any level of 
14. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Modern EqUiJI Protection Theories: A Metathe-
oretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 Ohio St. LJ. 3, 24-39 (1981). 
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welfare between $15,000 and zero. I shall call these intermediate 
positions compromise positions because they represent a com-
promise between pure Left liberalism and pure Right liberal. 
With the assumption in place that compromise positions as 
well as pure theories are constitutionally permitted, we can now 
account for the existence of constitutional options as well as for 
constraints on their allocation. The latter represent the fact that 
the Constitution permits only the sets of laws endorsed by Left 
or Right liberal theories or that represent compromises between 
those theories. It does not permit, say, welfare without qualifica-
tion. It permits welfare only up to what Left liberalism requires 
or down to what Right liberalism requires. Beyond those poles 
welfare is no longer optional. 
We have not yet gotten to where we need to go, however, 
for we have still not fully explained the constraints on allocations 
of optional benefits and burdens that orthodox constitutional law 
assumes. Consider the following example. Suppose Left liber-
alism requires $15,000 of welfare and Right liberalism requires 
that there be no welfare. And suppose the government enacts a 
welfare law granting poor whites $10,000 of welfare and poor 
blacks $5,000 of welfare. In the absence of some surprising rea-
son for this racial classification within the welfare law, we assume 
the welfare law violates the equal protection clause. But why, 
given that both $10,000 and $5,000 of welfare lie "between" the 
$15,000 and zero polar amounts of Left and Right liberalism? 
We need a theoretical explanation of constitutional constraints 
on allocations "between" the optional poles. 
Coming up with such an explanation has been a formidable 
problem in constitutional theory. If the government has the 
"greater" power to give poor blacks no welfare (because it has 
the power to eliminate welfare altogether), why does it not have 
the "lesser" power to give them some welfare, but less than it 
gives to whites? Analogously, if government has the "greater" 
power to make provocation immaterial to the crime of murder, 
why does it not have the "lesser" power to make it an element of 
the crime, but one not subject to the requirement of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt?ts Or, moving beyond constitutional 
law, why does not the "greater" power of publishing scandalous 
information about X include the "lesser" power of selling silence 
to X? 
15. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding shifting the burden of proof to the defendant for affirmative 
defenses). 
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One answer to the puzzle of constraints on intermediate po-
sitions is to argue that the particular position that is prohibited is 
not really an intermediate compromise. Thus, one could argue 
that although government may subsidize political campaigns at 
any level up to a certain amount-say, one million dollars-or 
not subsidize them at all, it may not subsidize Republican cam-
paigns at a higher level than Democratic ones because to do so 
would make Democrats worse off than had there been no subsidy 
at all, which is the pole marking one boundary of optionality. 
What appears to be a position "between" the poles of no subsidy 
and a one million dollar subsidy is really one in which the Demo-
crats are worse off than they are if both parties are at either pole. 
This kind of solution is sometimes offered for solving the 
puzzle of blackmail. Thus, it is argued that the victim of black-
mail-or at least the class of potential victims-or society at 
large is actually better off if blackmail is criminalized and the 
blackmailer is left to choose between disclosure and being un-
paid for silence.16 And this solution works for some kinds of op-
tional benefits, those the value of which is dependent on what 
others are getting. But it is doubtful that it works for all optional 
benefits. For example, are murder defendants really worse off if 
the prosecution must prove the absence of provocation by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence than if provocation is completely im-
material to the crime or its degree? And are poor blacks really 
worse off getting $5,000 of welfare when whites get $10,000 than 
if no one got any welfare at all? 
One might try instead to explain constitutional constraints 
on intermediate positions on the basis of this principle: When 
government reaches a compromise between the polar justifica-
tory theories, the compromise must reflect only considerations 
that are material under those theories and may not reflect con-
siderations that are extraneous to those theories. 
Thus, if Left liberals consider only the welfare of the least 
advantaged, and Right liberals only the integrity of one's person 
and property, and neither group considers race to be material, 
then government may not structure its welfare program in a way 
that assumes the theoretical materiality of race. That is not to 
say that racial distinctions are absolutely forbidden, for they 
might serve some further end that is material under one or both 
of the constraining theories. What government cannot do in be-
tween the Left and Right liberal poles is to act for ends that 
neither pole endorses. 
16. See Symposium: Blocknulil, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1565 (1993). 
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I shall characterize this constraint on allocations of optional 
benefits and burdens as the constraint of symmetry. To be con-
stitutionally permissible, an allocation lying "between" the polar 
justificatory theories must reflect nothing more than the relative 
political force of those theories and represent the point at which 
the force exerted by each theory in the political arena is exactly 
balanced by the force exerted by the opposite theory. If an allo-
cation reflects considerations extraneous to any justificatory the-
ory, then it will not represent a symmetrical compromise whose 
shape reflects only the political balance between the polar oppo-
site theories. Asymmetrical compromises will be unconstitu-
tional, which means that the requirement of symmetry is our 
missing constitutional constraint. 
Still, while the requirement of symmetry may describe the 
constitutional constraints on allocations falling between the theo-
retical poles, I leave it as an open question whether it adequately 
justifies those constraints. If blacks in my example are not worse 
off receiving less welfare than whites than they would be were 
they receiving no welfare, why should we view their relative 
treatment as a constitutional wrong? Some might answer that 
the treatment is "unfair." But what one regards as fair is a func-
tion of one's normative theory. Therefore, all one can be claim-
ing in describing the treatment as "unfair" is that the treatment is 
not what it should be under one or the other of the normative 
theories in play. In other words, it is not treatment endorsed by 
either Rawls or Nozick. But that is true of all compromise allo-
cations, not just those that treat blacks and whites differently. 
The position I am examining, then, can be restated as the 
following view: If we permit government to choose among two or 
more normative theories, then we have as many conceptions of 
fairness as we have permissible theories; but no allocation can be 
fair if it reflects values not endorsed by any of the permissible 
theories. More welfare for whites than for blacks is unfair to 
blacks because it must represent values extraneous to either Left 
or Right liberalism.17 
17. It remains an open question, however, whether this position is really a solution 
to the problem of constitutional constraints on allocations of optional benefits and bur-
dens or whether it is merely a redescription of the problem. I leave it to others to answer 
this question. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS, GOVERNMENTAL 
MOTIVES, AND EFFECTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 
A 
Let us assume that positing optional normative theories in 
the Constitution, which theories establish polar positions be-
tween which a government may act so long as it considers only 
the relative political forces exerted by the theories, explains how 
there can be constitutionally optional benefits and burdens 
whose allocations are nonetheless subject to constitutional con-
straints. The following sections examine some of the more troub-
lesome implications of such a view. I begin with the question of 
motive, then turn to effects, and finally examine remedies and 
standing. 
If there are going to be constitutional constraints on the allo-
cation of optional benefits and burdens, then government's moti-
vation must be a material element in the constitutional analysis. 
Why that is so can be illustrated by the following example, in 
which I assume that public swimming pools are constitutionally 
optional benefits, permitted but not required by the Constitution. 
Consider five states' policies regarding public pools: 
STATE ONE has had public swimming pools for many years. 
STATE Two has never had public swimming pools. 
STATE THREE has alternated between having and not having 
public swimming pools, depending upon whether Left or 
Right liberals controlled the legislature. The decisions the leg-
islature has taken have reflected only the conflict between 
Left and Right liberalism. Nonetheless, though quite coinci-
dentally, the pools have been open when whites have been the 
principal beneficiaries of the pools and have been closed when 
blacks would have been the principal beneficiaries. 
STATE FouR has also alternated between having and not hav-
ing public swimming pools. As in State Three, the public 
pools have been open when whites have been the principal 
beneficiaries and closed when blacks would have been the 
principal beneficiaries. Unlike State Three's legislature, how-
ever, State Four's has been motivated by anti-black attitudes. 
STATE FivE has had for many years a law authorizing public 
swimming pools "during periods when whites but not blacks 
would make up the preponderant share of pool users." 
Based on the preceding analysis, we can say that, at least 
prima facie, State One and State Two have acted constitutionally. 
Moreover, if they have acted constitutionally, then so too has 
State Three. As I argued earlier, the Constitution does not con-
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tain any principle that "freezes" the option first chosen by the 
government and entrenches it against repeal, assuming no tak-
ings, contractual impairment, or retroactivity problems. 
State Five has violated the Constitution, however. If race is 
not a factor picked out by our constraining Left and Right liberal 
normative theories, then State Five's policy is not a symmetrical 
compromise between optional poles. 
That leaves State Four. On the one hand, State Four's poli-
cies have had exactly the same external appearance and exactly 
the same effects in the world as State Three's constitutionally 
permissible policies. On the other hand, there is no functional 
difference between State Four's policies and the unconstitutional 
law in State Five. State Five's law is not invalid because of its 
effects during any narrow time slice. In any narrow time slice, its 
pools will either be open or closed, neither of which represents 
an unconstitutional state of affairs. (State laws unconstitutionally 
segregating public beaches were unconstitutional during all mo-
ments of their existence; but at some of those moments at least, 
no one actually wanted to swim or to swim at the forbidden 
beach.)ts Nor is State Five's law invalid because its pools will 
shift from open to closed or vice versa during certain time slices. 
State Five's law is invalid because it picks out race, an immaterial 
element under the justificatory theories, as a determining factor 
for the status of public pools and mandates that race shall affect 
that status for the indefinite future. 
There is no material difference between State Five's man-
date to consider race, a mandate that has no temporal limitation, 
and State Four's less formal consideration of race, which will be 
no more but surely no less determinative of what happens for the 
indefinite future. If State Five's law is unconstitutional, as we 
have assumed, then State Four's racially motivated actions are 
unconstitutional. Moreover, those actions are unconstitutional 
whether they are administrative actions opening and closing the 
pools or whether they are in the form of laws-"public pools," 
"no public pools" -so long as the underlying legislative or ad-
ministrative motives are the same.19 
18. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 
San Diego L. Rev. 925, 928-29 (esp. 929 n.20) (1978). 
19. See id. at 928-29; Alexander, 42 Ohio State L.J. at 21-23 (cited in note 14). 
The statement in text shows why the Supreme Court's decision in Palmer v. Thomp-
son, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), holding that racially motivated closing of public pools did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, is inconsistent with its decisions in cases such as Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down under the Equal Protection Clause an 
administrative action denying permission to operate a laundry because the applicant was 
Chinese). Palmer is no longer good law. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); 
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What makes State Four's actions functionally equivalent to 
State Five's is what also distinguishes its actions from State 
Three's. Because the legislature in State Three lacks a racial mo-
tive, it cannot be predicted to shift from public pools to no public 
pools or vice versa in ways that always relatively disadvantage 
Blacks, even though in the past those shifts have done so. 
What makes State Four's actions different from the constitu-
tionally permissible ones of State Three and similar to the uncon-
stitutional law in State Five is motive. Without motive as a 
material element in the constitutional analysis, we cannot make 
the distinctions we must make among the actions of States One 
through Five. Yet the necessity of a motive inquiry exacts an ex-
tremely high price as a matter of constitutional theory. 
Laws are unconstitutional because of their predicted effects 
over an indefinite period of time, not because of their effects dur-
ing any given time slice. After all, State Five's unconstitutional 
law did not differ in its past effects from the constitutionally per-
missible actions of State Three, nor would its effects differ during 
narrow time slices from the effects of State One's or State Two's 
constitutionally permissible laws. Legislative motivation is what 
provides the assumption that all law will persist over an indefi-
nite period of time, so that its predicted effects over an indefinite 
period become relevant. Because government's choice of an al-
location of optional benefits is not frozen by the Constitution and 
can always be changed, there is no basis other than motive for 
assuming durability over time. And unless durability over time is 
assumed, constitutional analysis breaks down. For if time is 
sliced sufficiently narrowly, it will be impossible to say of the al-
location of optional benefits and burdens during that narrow time 
slice that they violate the Constitution. 
But why assume motivations are durable? Government 
decisionmakers change over time. And any given government 
decisionmaker can change his or her attitudes over time. 
Take the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkinszo as an example. In 
that case, about three hundred Chinese applicants had been de-
nied licenses to operate laundries by the San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors before Yick Wo, too, was denied. This pattern did 
not itself make Yick Wo's denial unconstitutional. Had the pre-
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Developm~nt Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977). For the same reason, the Court's 1968 rejection of motive inquiry where th~ First 
Amendment and optional regulations intersect was untenable and ultimately repudiated. 
Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) with Wayte v. United States, 470 
u.s. 598 (1985). 
20. 118 u.s. 356 (1886). 
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vious three hundred applicants been denied licenses because they 
were Chinese, but Yick Wo was denied one because of a valid 
health, safety, or welfare concern, Yick Wo would not have had 
the constitutional grievance the previous three hundred appli-
cants had. What the past cases provided was circumstantial evi-
dence to support the hypothesis that an anti-Chinese motive 
explained a fair number if not all the results, since constitution-
ally permissible rationales for denials of licenses would be very 
unlikely to work against three hundred Chinese applicants in a 
row. 
What is significant, then, is that the past cases are relevant to 
Yick Wo's case but not material. They support his claim that he 
was denied a license unconstitutionally. And if we assume that 
Yick Wo's receiving a license was constitutionally optional-
there were available constitutionally permissible laws or policies 
regulating who gets a laundry license that San Francisco could 
have employed and that would have excluded Yick Wo-then 
what made Yick Wo's denial unconstitutional was its underlying 
motive. Yick Wo did not have a constitutional right to a license. 
Rather, he had a constitutional right not to have a license denied 
for improper reasons even when proper reasons for a denial were 
available. 
Now why should we care that Yick Wo was denied a license 
for the wrong reasons if good reasons were available? Why do 
we demand that government act for proper motives if what it 
does is consistent with proper motivation in any given case? The 
answer, I have argued, is that government's motivations, and the 
patterns of laws and actions to which they give rise, are presumed 
to persist for an indefinite period, during which period they will 
produce effects that cannot be squared with any justificatory the-
ory or proper compromise. 
But why assume such permanence? Suppose at the time of 
Yick Wo's trial the San Francisco Board of Supervisors was en-
tirely different from the Board that had denied Yick Wo his li-
cense. Suppose it is now controlled by Chinese members, so that 
no one will likely be denied a license because he is Chinese dur-
ing this Board's governance. The assumption of durability of the 
motive operative in Yick Wo's case has now been rendered false 
by the facts. Why should we deem Yick Wo to have suffered an 
unconstitutional denial? 
Or, to change the example to make it a State Five example 
rather than a State Four example, suppose the first three hundred 
cases of laundry license applications by Chinese, including Yick 
Wo's, were governed by a law that set forth criteria of eligibility 
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for such a license, among which was that one not be Chinese. 
Yick Wo's case is now before the court. The law under which he 
was denied a license has been repealed, however, and Chinese 
are now eligible. The law with its racial classification proved not 
to be indefinitely durable. How do we explain a conclusion that 
Yick Wo was dealt with unconstitutionally? 
The answer cannot be in the pattern of results under the law 
during the time it was in force. The reason is simple. That pat-
tern could have been produced constitutionally. For recall State 
Three and its opening and closing of public swimming pools. It 
produced the same pattern as did the unconstitutional actions of 
States Four and Five. All that can distinguish the states is the 
underlying motivation, and unless that motivation makes some 
difference in the effects of government action on individuals, it is 
hard to see why it matters. Because the motivation did not dis-
tinguish States Four and Five from State Three in the past, it 
must be its potential to do so in the future that makes it impor-
tant. In the hypothetical under consideration, however, that im-
proper motivation has disappeared. In that hypothetical, the 
future of States Four and Five, like their past, will be identical to 
that of State Three. Therefore, the materiality of motive is 
mysterious. 
Let us recap the argument here. We assumed that because 
State One and State Two were acting constitutionally, so too was 
State Three. To say otherwise would be to deny options at any 
point except at the beginning of the state's existence. But State 
Three was indistinguishable from States Four and Five on any 
basis but motive. And motive seemed material only if it was pro-
jected into the indefinite future. Its disappearance in our hypo-
thetical after Yick Wo's case then defeats its materiality. But 
orthodox constitutional doctrine assumes that if Yick Wo were 
denied a license based on his ancestry, he was treated unconstitu-
tionally, even if no one was ever treated that way again. We need 
motive to distinguish State Three from States Four and Five, but 
the distinction breaks down if motive is not indefinitely durable. 
If motive inquiry is necessary in order to deal with constitu-
tional optionality, then there are a number of important implica-
tions and problems that attend such an inquiry. Of course, there 
is the sometimes formidable evidentiary problem of discerning 
what government's motive is or was. The scope of this eviden-
tiary problem can only be fully appreciated by noting the follow-
ing implications and conceptual puzzles of motive inquiry. 
There are two principal implications of motive inquiry that 
should be mentioned because these two implications demon-
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strate the scope of the evidentiary difficulties. First, motive in-
quiry must extend to every law and governmental act that lie in 
the domain of constitutional optionality. To return to our origi-
nal examples, if motive is material in State Four, the state that 
opened and closed its public schools depending upon whether 
whites or blacks were primarily benefited, then the motive be-
hind the laws in State One, Two, and Three are also material. 
For improper motives are all that distinguish States Four and 
Five from States One, Two, and Three at any given moment in 
time. 
The second implication is this: Not only must every law or 
governmental decision allocating optional benefits and burdens 
be subjected to motive inquiry, but so also must every repeal of a 
law and failure to enact a law. A set of laws may be constitution-
ally permissible at one moment and constitutionally impermissi-
ble at the next without any change on the books if the motive for 
not changing that set of laws changes from a constitutionally per-
missible motive to a constitutionally prohibited one. 
There are a number of conceptual problems that attend mo-
tive inquiry, some well known, others less so. A well known 
problem concerns the "motive" of a multimember body. 
Although many optional benefits and burdens are allocated ac-
cording to policies attributable to individual government deci-
sionmakers, many are allocated according to policies embodied 
in laws, regulations, and ordinances enacted by multimember leg-
islative bodies. When we speak of the motives of such bodies, to 
what facts in the world are we referring? How do we cumulate 
the motives of real persons to arrive at the motive of a collective? 
What if no particular motive is sufficient for passage (or for fail-
ure to enact, or for repeal) of a law? What if no particular mo-
tive is necessary? And what do we do with the motives of chief 
executives with veto power,21 or with the motives of those oppos-
ing the law (or failure to enact, or repeal)? 
A perhaps less well known conceptual problem is that of 
mixed motivation. Government officials take actions based upon 
all sorts of motives, many of which operate simultaneously. 
Some officials' motives are just to please their constituents, who 
have their own motives for supporting or opposing various acts. 
Some officials have other kinds of personal motives (this will 
make me a hero, or a martyr, etc.). And some officials have a 
mixture of motives reflecting both licit and illicit social concerns. 
21. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 666-67 nn.6-7 
(1981). 
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Does the presence of any motive other than the motive to bring 
about the state of affairs mandated by one of the justificatory 
theories render the officials' motives unconstitutional? Or must 
those other motives be dominant? Sufficient? Necessary? 
An even less well known conceptual problem with motive 
inquiry has to do with the hierarchical relationship among mo-
tives. When we act we do so for the sake of some ultimate ends, 
but we also have intermediate ends that motivate us because they 
are believed to be means to our ultimate ends. Suppose, how-
ever, as is no doubt frequently the case, our intermediate ends do 
not serve our ultimate ends, and we are mistaken in believing 
them to do so? Although we view our motivations to be consis-
tent, they are in fact inconsistent. For example, we are motivated 
as legislators to achieve the ideals of Left liberalism, and we are 
motivated to support more redistribution of wealth because we 
believe more redistribution will bring about those ideals. Yet, it 
turns out that we are mistaken, and that more redistribution will 
in fact take us farther away from our ideals. If the test of consti-
tutionally proper motivation is whether we are motivated to 
achieve the ends of one of the optional justificatory theories, are 
we properly motivated? 
In fact, however, this otherwise potentially perplexing prob-
lem, unlike the other conceptual and evidentiary problems asso-
ciated with motive inquiry, turns out to be rather easily 
resolvable. For intermediate motives that are inconsistent with 
proper ultimate motives will produce laws and actions whose ef-
fects fail to match those the normative theories prescribe. And as 
the next section argues, effects as well as motives matter. 
B 
Thus far I have been both making the case for motive in-
quiry in allocations of constitutionally optional benefits and bur-
dens and also raising various theoretical difficulties with that 
case. Even if motive is material, however, so too must be the 
effects of government's laws and actions. Proper motivation-in 
our example, the motivation to realize Left or Right liberalism or 
a symmetrical compromise between them-is necessary for con-
stitutionality, but it cannot be sufficient. If laws or actions pro-
duce effects that are inconsistent with such laws' or actions' 
underlying proper motivations, the laws or actions cannot be 
constitutional. For ultimately, effects in the world are all that 
matter, even conceding the materiality of motivation. Or put 
somewhat differently, no properly motivated government would 
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be content with laws that in fact do not achieve the ideals of the 
admissible normative theories or a proper compromise. Thus, 
proper motivation and proper effects are both necessary for con-
stitutionality, and neither is sufficient by itself. 
Although the materiality of effects complicates the constitu-
tional analysis of optional allocations in one sense, it solves the 
last of the previously mentioned conceptual problems of motive 
inquiry, namely, the problem of mistaken intermediate motives. 
If a legislature has a proper ultimate motivation but has an im-
proper lower level motivation (because it misperceives the rela-
tion in the world between the two), its law will probably produce 
effects that are inconsistent with the ultimate motivation and its 
justificatory normative theory. For example, if a legislature is 
properly motivated to achieve, say, Left liberalism, but errone-
ously believes that racial classifications further that end and so is 
motivated to enact laws containing racial classifications, those 
laws will probably produce effects that fail to correspond to a 
proper justificatory theory or compromise. Thus, even if we do 
not deem laws unconstitutional because of improper intermedi-
ate motivations, those laws will almost always be unconstitu-
tional due to their effects. 
V. REMEDIES AND STANDING 
Even if we can figure out when and why allocations of op-
tional benefits and burdens are unconstitutional, what are we jus-
tified in demanding of the lawmakers when we identify an 
unconstitutional allocation? If, for instance, the allocation is un-
constitutional because of its underlying motivation, as was State 
Four's opening and closing of public pools in our earlier example, 
or Yick Wo's license denial, what should follow? Must the pools 
be kept open? Must Yick Wo get his license? Remember that 
those states of affairs, though constitutional (with proper motiva-
tion), are not inherently "more" constitutional than their oppo-
sites (with proper motivation). And although we can ask 
government to go back and make a new allocation with proper 
motivation, there is no way to ensure that it will do so and good 
reason to think that bad motives will persist for some period. 
What do we do, then, if government does not provide a new, 
properly-motivated allocation? 
The problem transcends unconstitutionality due to improper 
motivation and includes unconstitutionality due to improper ef-
fects. Even if State Four or the San Francisco Board of Supervi-
sors were motivated by a legitimate normative theory and were 
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merely misapplying it, so that the effects did not match the the-
ory's blueprint, the problem of remedy would remain. Nor is the 
problem circumscribed to a choice between pools or no pools, or 
between a license or no license. For the range of optional alloca-
tions permitted includes every alternative set of laws except the 
forbidden ones. Thus, State Four might close its pools but re-
place them with tennis courts, close its pools and put the money 
into tax refunds, open its pools, but with shorter seasons, and so 
on. San Francisco might ban laundries in wooden buildings alto-
gether, or require licensees to prove financial solvency, to take 
courses in laundry operations, or any of a number of possibilities, 
some of which would result in Yick Wo's getting a license, others 
of which would not. If government does not enact an option with 
permissible effects and based on proper motives, what set of laws 
out of the indefinitely larger number of constitutionally optional 
sets should be imposed remedially? 
There is no way to finesse this problem. Given that the ex-
isting set of laws is unconstitutional, some alternative set must be 
imposed, and optionality assumes that there is more than one 
such set. There is no way to avoid imposition, for the status quo 
ante is unconstitutional. And we have said that repeals, failures 
to enact, or failures to repeal can be unconstitutional (due to un-
derlying motivation), which reinforces the point that some option 
other than the status quo must be imposed. But which? 
The problem of optional remedies leads to the problem of 
standing. Under each possible constitutionally optional set of 
laws that might supplant the present unconstitutional set, there 
will be different winners and losers. Who then has standing to 
challenge an unconstitutional set of laws? Does anyone who 
would benefit under a constitutionally permissible set that might 
supplant the existing set have standing to challenge that set? 
Consider Regents v. Bakke.zz The Supreme Court held that 
racial set-asides in the admissions process violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. Alan Bakke presumably would have been ad-
mitted had there been a racially-blind consideration of only 
grades and test scores. Moreover, such an alternative system of 
admission to state medical schools would have been constitu-
tional, or so the Court implied and everyone assumed. Presuma-
bly, because this latter system would have been constitutional 
and would have resulted in Bakke's admission, whereas Davis's 
actual system was unconstitutional and resulted in denying him 
admission, Bakke was deemed to have standing to challenge the 
22. Regents of the Univ. of Calif at Davis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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constitutionality of Davis's system.23 It was unconstitutional as 
to him. 
But note that the Court did not deny that state-run medical 
schools were constitutionally optional. Nor did the Court imply 
that if the state chooses to have a medical school, it can only be 
of one type with one kind of admissions process. We must as-
sume that the University of California could close its Davis cam-
pus medical school, keep it open but restrict it to certain 
specialties, keep it open but have open admission, and so on. 
The more options the Constitution leaves open to the University 
of California, the more people who might benefit by holding the 
status quo to be unconstitutional. If Bakke had standing to chal-
lenge the system, why would not anyone else who might benefit 
from some constitutionally optional alternative? 
One answer is that the system in Bakke was "unfair" to 
Bakke but not to others. This reply is unsatisfactory, however, 
because the system is unfair to Bakke only by reference to an 
alternative under which Bakke benefits. However, there are al-
ternatives under which persons other than Bakke who could not 
get into medical school for other reasons would benefit, as well, 
and many under which Bakke would not benefit. For example, 
applicants who would have gained admission under an open or 
random admission process but who would not qualify for admis-
sion under the system in Bakke could also claim to have been 
treated "unfairly." 
VI. OTHER APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONALLY 
OPTIONAL BENEFITS AND BURDENS 
I have described a particular way of understanding how the 
Constitution might constrain the allocation of benefits and bur-
dens that are otherwise constitutionally optional. One might 
conclude, however, that the way I have described, which depends 
upon the Constitution's referring to two or more alternative nor-
mative theories as ultimate sources for evaluating government 
action, succeeds at too high a price. For if optional normative 
theories explain constitutionally constrained but constitutionally 
optional benefits and burdens, then constitutional analysis will be 
burdened with messy evidentiary problems regarding motives 
and effects, conceptual problems regarding motives, and uncer-
tainty regarding remedies and standing. 
23. Id. at 277-81, 320. 
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Thus, there is reason to look briefly at some possible alter-
natives to this way of reconciling constitutional optionality with 
constitutional constraint. In this concluding section, I shall do so. 
Suppose that the Constitution does not refer to optional 
normative theories. Suppose that only one such theory lies be-
hind the constitutional scheme, and that the appearance of op-
tional benefits and burdens is just that, an appearance, and one 
born of judicial uncertainty about what the one animating nor-
mative theory requires. Thus, if the Constitution embodies 
Rawlsian contractarianism, then where the courts can discern 
what that theory requires, they stand ready to invalidate laws and 
actions that are inconsistent with it. Where, however, they are 
uncertain regarding what Rawlsian contractarianism requires, 
they defer to the legislature's choice, which creates the sense that 
the legislature has an option under the Constitution. In reality, 
of course, it does not, but the courts' epistemic limitations trans-
late into legislative finality regarding the constitutionality of its 
choices. 
On the other hand, even if some allocations of benefits and 
burdens are treated by the courts as if they are optional because 
the courts do not know which allocations are required by the one 
normative theory in play, other allocations of those same benefits 
and burdens need not be so treated. For example, the courts may 
not know whether Rawlsian contractarianism requires a high 
level of wealth redistribution or a much lower level, but they may 
be quite certain that Rawlsian contractarianism cannot justify, 
say, high welfare for whites and low welfare for blacks. 
Thus, we have an alternative account of how there can be 
constitutionally optional benefits and burdens that are nonethe-
less somewhat constitutionally constrained, an account that 
posits only one justifying normative theory rather than multiple 
ones.24 Nonetheless, although this account may affect the legisla-
ture and administrators differently from the earlier one-it di-
rects them to try to realize the ideals of a single normative theory 
rather than giving them a choice among more than one-it af-
fects the courts qua reviewing agencies no differently from the 
earlier one. From the courts' perspective, at least, there will be 
constitutional options. And if there are constitutional options, 
then from the courts' perspective, it will be as if there actually 
were constitutionally optional normative theories. All of the 
problems of motive inquiry, remedies, and standing that arose 
under our original account will arise for the courts under this ac-
24. See Alexander, 42 Ohio St. L.J. at 20 (cited in note 14). 
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count, and in exactly the same way. Options as a consequence of 
epistemic uncertainty will for the courts feel no different from 
options as a consequence of normative relativity. 
An alternative account of optional benefits/burdens and 
their constraints can be found in process theories of constitu-
tional law, such as John Ely's.zs Essentially, these theories view 
the Constitution as a set of very narrow constraints designed to 
ensure well-functioning democratic institutions. So long as those 
institutions do not attempt to free themselves from the con-
straints that ensure the purity of the process and are not other-
wise infected with process-undermining conditions (such as 
"prejudice"), their decisions are constitutional whatever those 
decisions may be. 
There is a familiar and I believe fatal objection to process 
accounts of constitutional law such as Ely's. Commentators as 
diverse as Paul Brest, Samuel Freeman, Laurence Tribe, and 
Michael Perry have pointed out that process theories ultimately 
must rest on substantive theories (in Ely's case, some version of 
utilitarianism).26 Without a substantive theory, no particular pro-
cess nor set of constraints can be justified. With a substantive 
theory, however, the existence of options becomes problematic. 
A similar criticism applies to more philosophically ambitious 
"process" theories, such as the "dialogic" theories of Bruce Ack-
erman and Jtirgen Habermas:z7 the substantive constraints neces-
sary to secure an "ideal speech situation" for reaching moral 
agreement may include everything morally significant, leaving no 
options open for dialogic resolution.zs 
Another way to preserve constitutional options that are 
nonetheless constrained is to interpret constraints such as equal 
protection and freedom of speech as very specific, rule-like 
prohibitions and not as broad moral principles. For example, if 
equal protection just means the state may not discriminate on the 
25. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harv. U. 
Press, 1980). 
26. See Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 131 (1981); Samuel 
Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 9 Law & Phil. 
327 (1990-91); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu-
tional Theories, 89 Yale LJ. 1063, 1071 (1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, The 
Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Letigimacy of Constitutional Policymaking 
by the Judiciary n-90 (Yale U. Press, 1982). 
27. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale U. Press, 1980); 
Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Beacon Press, Thomas McCarthy, trans., 1975). 
28. See Walzer, Moral Minima/ism, in W.R. Shea & A. Spadafora, eds., From the 
Twilight of Probability: Ethics and Politics 3, 11 (Science History Publications, 1992); 
Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 San Diego L. 
Rev. 763, 784-85 n.48 (1993). 
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basis of race and ethnicity in the allocation of benefits and bur-
dens, then all allocations that do not rest on racial or ethnic dis-
tinctions will be optional insofar as the Equal Protection Clause 
is concerned.z9 Similarly, if freedom of speech is just a rule 
against viewpoint discrimination, then government has a consid-
erable range of options as far as freedom of speech is concerned. 
The problem with viewing constitutional constraints in this 
rule-like manner is that rules cannot be judicially extended or 
modified to adapt to everchanging situations. For example, an 
Equal Protection Clause that is a "rule" against racial or ethnic 
discrimination simply does not apply to gender discrimination, 
discrimination against illegitimates, and so forth, even if these 
latter forms of discrimination are morally analogous to the forms 
proscribed. Extension of a rule by analogy requires treating the 
rule as merely an application of a more general principle, which 
principle covers the new case and renders it analogous to those 
covered by the original rule. In short, extensions of a rule re-
quire treating it not as a rule but as a principle. 
Now there are advantages to treating constitutional provi-
sions as rules, not principles. Justice Scalia has written in favor of 
doing so wholesale;Jo Fred Schauer has endorsed doing so re-
tail.Jt And treating constitutional provisions as rules preserves 
the optionality of most benefits and burdens while at the same 
time explaining how they can be constrained. On the other hand, 
rules are posited, canonical norms, and arguments over their in-
terpretation are highly constrained by these characteristics. If 
the 1868 Framers failed to consider how gender discrimination 
was morally similar to racial discrimination in fashioning their 
equal protection "rule," gender discrimination is forever after ex-
empt from equal protection invalidation, even if the moral princi-
ple that lies behind equal protection also applies to gender 
discrimination. That some practice is morally like another is a 
conclusive moral reason for treating them the same way, but it is 
frequently a very weak reason for assuming that the framers of a 
rule that deals with one also meant the rule to deal with the 
other. Rules are the products of particular individuals at particu-
lar times laboring under limitations of knowledge, imagination, 
empathy, and logic. 
29. See note 11 supra. 
30. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 
(1989). 
31. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-
Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon Press, 1991). 
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Some might argue that constitutional constraints are not 
fixed, limited rules but rather reflect some single but powerful 
moral principle, such as the principle of equality of respect or the 
principle against subordination.32 Government's options regard-
ing benefits and burdens can be quite broad; so long as govern-
ment's allocations do not reflect inequality of respect or do not 
subordinate, they are constitutionally permissible. For example, 
both welfare and its absence could be constitutionally permissi-
ble, whereas welfare for whites but not blacks would violate the 
equality of respect and/or anti-subordination principle. Thus, we 
end up with constitutional options and constitutional constraints. 
The problem with these theories lies in their assumption that 
equality of respect or anti-subordination principles can be 
fleshed out without a full-blown normative theory that would in 
turn undermine optionality. For example, Dworkin, who intro-
duced equality of respect as his candidate for the equal protec-
tion norm, has now fleshed out that principle to entail a complete 
moral philosophy.33 And there is no reason to assume that an 
anti-subordination principle would not lead to the same result. 
For example, it is a very short step from "welfare for whites but 
not blacks subordinates blacks" to "no welfare for anyone subor-
dinates blacks (who are disproportionately likely to be poor)." 
Indeed, it is a step many have already taken.34 And the implicit 
theory behind such a step would leave little room for options. 
One final theory for reconciling constitutional options with 
constitutional constraints is to view the latter as directed toward 
forbidding government from (unjustly) stigmatizing persons. For 
example, all sorts of allocations might be permissible, but those 
that would stigmatize, such as more welfare for whites than for 
blacks, would be unconstitutional. 
This theory would, of course, need a theory about when per-
sons are justified in feeling stigmatized, so that the mere claim 
that one feels stigmatized is not sufficient to make out a constitu-
tional violation. Presumably the theory would link the justifiabil-
ity of feeling stigmatized to actually being stigmatized. It would 
thus have to provide an account of when people are stigmatized, 
or more specifically, are stigmatized unjustifiably. 
32. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180-83, 272-78 (Harv. U. Press, 
1977) (equality of respect); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 16-21 
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988) (antisubjugation). 
33. See Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in Grethe B. Peterson, 
ed., XI The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1 (1990). 
34. See Tribe, American Constitlltional Law at 1518-21 (cited in note 32). 
314 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:287 
It should be apparent, however, that a theory of unjustifi-
able stigmatization, like theories of equality of respect or subor-
dination, must inevitably tum into a full-blown normative theory. 
People will be unjustifiably stigmatized to the extent-and only 
to the extent-they do not receive their moral due. Even if the 
focus is restricted to government officials' states of mind-did 
they regard the constitutional claimants in an unjustifiably stig-
matic manner?-the states of mind can only be characterized as 
stigmatizing by reference to a full-blown normative theory. 
Moreover, if the gravamen of the complaint is that the officials' 
states of mind are stigmatizing, no remedy exists to cure such a 
constitutional defect: we can impose sets of laws on governmen-
tal officials, but we cannot-or surely courts with their ordinary 
remedies cannot-change officials' views of others. If unconsti-
tutional stigma lies in the officials' attitudes, stigma is beyond the 
power of courts to remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that reconciling constitutionally optional ben-
efits and burdens with constitutional constraints on their alloca-
tions is theoretically problematic. Constraints seem to require a 
normative theory, but a single normative theory undermines the 
existence of options. Linking constitutional options to optional 
normative theories, however, saves options at the cost of intro-
ducing the difficult practical and conceptual problems of motive 
inquiry, remedy, and standing. Finally, other approaches (pure 
process, equality of respect, anti-subordination, anti-stigmatic) 
either require a background normative theory, which again will 
undermine options, or rest on conceiving constitutional con-
straints to be limited, fixed rules, opaque to background moral 
principles and incapable of extension or modification. It is thus 
not surprising that the intersection of constitutionally optional 
benefits and burdens with constitutional constraints has pro-
duced a doctrinal mess and a theoretical nightmare.3s 
35. See Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 175 (1989). 
